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The success of cooperative strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game
Blekinge Tekniska Högskola.
Kristianstad University, School of Education and Environment, Avdelningen för Naturvetenskap. Kristianstad University, Research environment Man & Biosphere Health (MABH).ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1732-0372
2007 (English)In: Scalable Computing: Practice and Experience: Scientific International Journal for Parallel and Distributed Computing, ISSN 1895-1767, Vol. 8, no 1, 87-100 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The prisoner's dilemma has evolved into a standard game for analyzing the success of cooperative strategies in repeated games. With the aim of investigating the behavior of strategies in some alternative games we analyzed the outcome of iterated games for both the prisoner's dilemma and the chicken game. In the chicken game, mutual defection is punished more strongly than in the prisoner's dilemma, and yields the lowest fitness. We also ran our analyses under different levels of noise. The results reveal a striking difference in the outcome between the games. Iterated chicken game needed more generations to find a winning strategy. It also favored nice, forgiving strategies able to forgive a defection from an opponent. In particular the well-known strategy tit-for-tat has a poor successrate under noisy conditions. The chicken game conditions may be relatively common in other sciences, and therefore we suggest that this game should receive more interest as a cooperative game from researchers within computer science.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. Vol. 8, no 1, 87-100 p.
Keyword [en]
Game theory, prisoner's dilemma, chicken game, noise, tit-for-tat
National Category
Probability Theory and Statistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-12468OAI: oai:DiVA.org:hkr-12468DiVA: diva2:735589
Available from: 2014-07-29 Created: 2014-07-29 Last updated: 2017-02-28Bibliographically approved

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Jönsson, K. Ingemar
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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf